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Abstract:
Our purpose in this paper is to provide an overview of what we know about alliance
contracts. After a short introduction to the contents of alliance contracts, we start
by contrasting alliance contractual form and governance form. Next, we focus on two related
constructs: contractual complexity and contractual completeness. We suggest that contractual
complexity is a more adequate construct to investigate in the absence of information about
the transaction contemplated in the contract. After that, we present the measures of
contractual complexity used in past studies. Then, we go over the determinants of contractual
complexity by considering their influence on contracting costs and benefits given
environmental and behavioral uncertainty. Conclusions and suggestions for research are
offered at the end.
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Introduction
“Formal contracts represent promises or obligations to perform particular actions in
the future (Macneil, 1978).” “The basic purpose of making a contract (…) is to prevent
change, or at least to provide compensation for it (Snyder, 1999)” (Ring, 2002: 147). Alliance
partners are exposed to uncertainties about future states of nature (environmental uncertainty)
and about the future behavior of the counterpart once in the alliance (behavioral uncertainty).
Alliance contracts are therefore useful in providing “guidance to the courts on partner
intentions should the alliance break down” (Ryall and Sampson, 2003: 3). However, contracts
do something more than safeguard partners against unforeseen events or partner opportunism.
There is empirical evidence that alliance contracts include terms that are legally
unenforceable, such as business plans (Ryall and Sampson, 2003). Thus, it seems that
alliance contracts provide an opportunity to define partner expectations, and to help them
plan activities.
Despite their importance, formal contracts have received scant attention from
alliance researchers. Those concerned with alliance design have focused mainly on the choice
of governance form. The conditions under which an alliance is the most efficient governance
form have been studied extensively (e.g., Hennart, 1988; Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Chi,
1994; Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Reuer and Koza, 2000). The choice of alliance form has
received some attention as well, with some studies addressing the question of when an equity
alliance is preferable to a non-equity structure (e.g., Pisano, 1989, 1990; Osborn and Baughn,
1990; Gulati, 1995; Oxley, 1997). Of the few empirical studies that consider alliance
contracts, the earlier ones do so using contract-related variables as explanatory variables of
other alliance attributes or outcomes (Parkhe, 1993; Deeds and Hill, 1998; Reuer and Ariño,
2002). The study of contract characteristics as dependent variables to be explained is very
recent (Luo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Mayer, 2003; Reuer and Ariño, 2003; Reuer,
Ariño and Mellewigt, 2003; Ryall and Sampson, 2003). Nonetheless, the literature on the
economics of contracting serves as a source of inspiration for the study of alliance contracts
and can provide more detailed guidance to managers as to how to set up their collaborative
agreements.
Our purpose in this paper is to provide an overview of what we know about alliance
contracts. After a short introduction to the contents of alliance contracts, we start by
contrasting alliance contractual form and governance form. Next, we focus on two related
We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Anselmo Rubiralta Center for Research on
Globalization and Strategy at IESE.constructs: contractual complexity and contractual completeness. We suggest that contractual
complexity is a more adequate construct to investigate in the absence of information about
the transaction contemplated in the contract. After that, we present the measures of
contractual complexity used in past studies. Then, we go over the determinants of contractual
complexity by considering their influence on contracting costs and benefits given
environmental and behavioral uncertainty. Conclusions and suggestions for research are
offered at the end.
Research on alliance contracts
Until recently, little was known about the contents of alliance contracts, primarily
due to the difficulties entailed in accessing this kind of data (Ring, 2002; Ryall and Sampson,
2003). Typically, a contract outlines the roles and responsibilities of each party, the allocation
of decision and control rights, the planning for various contingencies, how the parties will
communicate, and how to resolve disputes (Argyres and Mayer, 2004). In a piece aimed at
practitioners, Campbell and Reuer (2001) offer a comprehensive overview of the basic legal
issues an alliance contract should contemplate (see Box 1 for an outline). While they focus on
bilateral equity joint ventures (JVs), they make clear that many of the same considerations
apply to non-equity alliances –except for issues associated with share-related provisions and
so on– and to multilateral alliances –except that negotiating these contracts is probably more
complex than negotiating bilateral agreements.
Box 1: Basic legal issues included in typical alliance contracts
– Establishment issues:
•  Preliminary issues:
– confidentiality or nondisclosure agreement; 
– “lockout” provision preventing the parties from conducting parallel negotiations
with a competitor.
•  Setting up the alliance:
– shareholdings (applicable to equity alliances only): 
- partners’ contributions deemed as equal (50/50 ownership and control
structure): provisions to break potential deadlocks;
- partners’ contributions not deemed as equal: provisions establishing the need
to have the minority partner’s approval on crucial decisions;
– board of directors and staffing (applicable to equity alliances only): 
- proportion of managers that should come from each company;
- what their minimum qualifications should be;
- whether the other party may object to any individual;
- what the level and source of remuneration should be;
– articles of association (applicable to equity alliances only): shareholders’
agreement on issues such as:
- passing resolutions, 
2- share issuance, transfer, and disposal, 
- appointment of directors, etc.
– place of incorporation (applicable to equity alliances only) and advisors such as
lawyers or accountants.
•  Parties and framework of contract:
– identification of the parties; 
– purpose of the agreement;
– main body of the agreement specifying the obligations and restrictions on the
parent companies;
– “boiler plate” clauses or standard provisions around a variety of issues;
– signature and data clauses;
– schedules that detail elements of the agreement;
– “all agreement” clause indicating that no other documents or oral agreements are
part of the enforceable contract. If there is a document intended to be part of the
contract, then it should be clearly incorporated within it.
• Performance clauses:
– duties and obligations of the partners, 
– timing of any performance. 
• Restrictions on the partners:
– non-competition or non-solicitation clauses;
– confidentiality agreements, possibly including that any public statements about the
alliance must be approved by both parties;
– ownership and licensing of intellectual property rights. 
• Liability:
– agreement on the extent to which they will be liable, possibly settling a certain
amount of money; 
– in case of force majeure, agreement on how long the situation may last before a
new partner is sought or the alliance is dissolved.
–  Post-establishment issues:
• Changes to the contract:
–a   clause establishing that changes to the contract will be written and signed by both
parties is common;
– change control procedure: schedule, level of management that can agree to a
contractual change;
– minimum number of formal meetings to review issues concerning the alliance;
– consideration of the transfer of the agreement and the obligations within it to
another party. 
• Dispute resolution:
– escalation procedure: usually a dispute is first referred to the partners’ operational
managers, then to senior management, then to an outsider for assistance, then to a
mediation or arbitration procedure;
– recourse to the courts:
- which courts would have jurisdiction; 
- whose laws will govern the agreement. 
3• Share disposal (applicable to equity alliances only):
– circumstances in which new shares will be issued and to whom;
– transfer of shares between the partners or to an outside party: advice notice;
preemption rights;*
– what happens with the JV’s subsidiaries
– all shares of one partner to be dealt with in a block
– restrictions on transfer of shares to outsiders;
– how the shares are to be valued;*
– circumstances that trigger the transfer of shares
•T ermination:
– share disposal issues (applicable to equity alliances only)
– circumstances under which the agreement will be terminated, including what
constitutes a serious breach leading to alliance termination
– consequences of termination: what will happen to personnel, intellectual property
rights, assets, and contracts and obligations
Based on Campbell and Reuer (2001).
* For further details, refer to the original article.
Contractual form and governance form: Disentangling the confusion
Contractual forms and governance forms serve different purposes in shaping
economic exchanges. Based on Williamson (1979, 1985) and other authors, James (2000: 48)
states that “the specific exchanges negotiated by trading partners and the allocation of risks
and trading gains resulting from them (…) constitute a contract,” while governance refers to
“alternative institutional modes for organizing transactions” (Williamson, 1979: 234).
Governance form solves the boundary problem, while contractual form specifies terms of
trade.
Although governance form and contractual form are related, there is not necessarily
a one-to-one relationship. Empirical evidence suggests that significant contractual
heterogeneity within types of governance form exists. In their study of 200 contracts of
biotechnology non-equity alliances, Lerner and Merges (1998) report 25 types of control
rights. They analyze the incidence of these control rights, excluding from their sample terms
that appear in less than 5% or in more than 95% of the contracts. Their findings show that
some of the controls appear in as few as 6 percent of the contracts, and some in as many as
93 percent, with a mean number of 9.3 control rights per contract. Reuer and Ariño (2003)
collected data on 8 types of contractual provisions in 91 alliances across a variety of
industries. In the case of equity alliances, the incidence of provisions ranges between 39 and
82 percent of the contracts. The range varies from 26 to 58 percent in the case of non-equity
alliances. In a related study of 66 alliances in the German telecommunications industry
(Reuer, Ariño and Mellewigt, 2003), the same 8 provisions were analyzed. In this case, the
incidence varies between 33 and 100 percent of the equity alliance contracts, and between 11
and 93 percent of the non-equity alliance contracts.
There is also emerging evidence that the incidence of contractual terms does not
vary significantly between equity and non-equity alliances. Reuer and Ariño (2003) report no
significant differences in the mean incidence of particular contractual provisions between
4equity and non-equity alliances, with the exception of auditing rights provisions, which
appear in 82 percent of the equity-alliance contracts, and only in 26 percent of the non-equity
ones. The same result (44 vs. 11 percent) holds in their study with Mellewigt (2003).
Furthermore, contractual and governance form have some common and some
different determinants, as Table 1 shows. Asset specificity and prior ties appear as the only
common determinants to governance form (Reuer and Ariño, 2002; Reuer, Ariño and
Mellewigt, 2003) and to contractual complexity (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Reuer and Ariño,
2003; Reuer, Ariño and Mellewigt, 2003). Other determinants of governance form include
transaction activities (Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 1989), technology scope (Oxley, 1997), the
existence of potential alternative partners (Reuer and Ariño, 2002), and partner search costs
(Reuer, Ariño and Mellewigt, 2003). On the other hand, contractual complexity seems
associated to technological change (Poppo and Zenger, 2002), performance measurement
difficulty (Poppo and Zenger, 2002), the alliance being time bound (Reuer and Ariño, 2003),
the strategic importance assigned to the alliance (Reuer and Ariño, 2003; Reuer, Ariño and
Mellewigt, 2003), and the firm’s age (Reuer, Ariño and Mellewigt, 2003).
Table 1. Illustrative determinants of alliance contractual complexity and governance form
Determinants of: Contractual  Governance
complexity form Studies
Asset specificity X X Reuer and Ariño, 2002; Reuer, Ariño and 
Mellewigt, 2003
Prior ties X X Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Reuer and Ariño, 
2003; Reuer, Ariño and Mellewigt, 2003
Transaction activities X Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 1989
Technology scope X Oxley, 1997
Alternative partners X Reuer and Ariño, 2002
Partner search costs X Reuer, Ariño and Mellewigt, 2003
Technological change X Poppo and Zenger, 2002
Performance measurement difficulty X Poppo and Zenger, 2002
Alliance time-boundedness  X Reuer and Ariño, 2003
Alliance strategic importance X Reuer and Ariño, 2003; Reuer, Ariño and 
Mellewigt, 2003
Firm age X Reuer, Ariño and Mellewigt, 2003
Confusion between contractual and governance form results in a simplified
depiction of managerial control increasing as one moves from market-based to internalized
exchanges. In the context of alliance research, often it is assumed that equity alliances confer
greater control than non-equity alliances because shared ownership and the presence of a
joint board serve as incentive alignment mechanisms in the former arrangement (e.g.,
Hennart, 1993; Chi, 1994). However, contracts of non-equity alliances can also incorporate
numerous controls. The 25 different types of control rights reported by Lerner and Merges
5(1998) provide evidence of this. Practitioners considered that the key control rights are those
terms that relate to the management of the alliance: management of clinical trials, control of
the initial manufacturing process, control of manufacturing after product approval, creation
of exclusive territory for R&D firm, and creation of co-marketing rights for R&D firm.
In sum, contractual form and governance form serve different purposes. There is
substantial contractual heterogeneity within types of governance form, while some clauses
are as likely to appear in equity as in non-equity alliance contracts. Furthermore, contractual
and governance form share few determinants. The two are distinct features of alliance design,
and subsuming contractual features within discrete governance structures may be misleading.
Thus, alliance research that delves into contract characteristics is worth the effort to better
understand alliance design and the negotiation of collaborative relationships.
Contractual complexity and contractual completeness: The constructs
Contractual complexity and contractual completeness are two related concepts that
often are used interchangeably in the literature, or else are confused. Williamson (1985:20)
states “[drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement] can be done with a great deal
of care, in which case a complex document is drafted in which numerous contingencies are
recognized, and appropriate adaptations by the parties are stipulated and agreed to in
advance. Or the document can be very incomplete, the gaps to be filled in by the parties as
the contingencies arise.” Implicitly, he is contrasting complexity and incompleteness. Later on
in his book, Williamson (1985: 178) suggests that complexity and completeness do not go
hand-in-hand necessarily: “[c]omplex contracts are invariably incomplete, and many are
maladaptive.”
In the context of air force engine procurement, Crocker and Reynolds (1993: 126)
describe incomplete exchange agreements as those in which “contracting parties intentionally
leave unspecified their duties in certain contingencies.” A totally complete contract is one in
which all potential contingencies are covered; a totally incomplete contract places no
strictures at all on the terms under which subsequent trade may be effected. Intermediate
degrees of contractual completeness specify duties for some contingencies, leaving the other
possibilities to future resolution as events unfold. Clearly, term specificity is contemplated
here explicitly, while contingency adaptability, only implicitly.
Along these lines, Luo (2002: 903-904) describes a complete contract as one that
“simultaneously obviates opportunism through term specificity and bolsters adaptation
through contingency adaptability.” Term specificity and contingency adaptability are two
dimensions of contract completeness. This characterization of contract completeness is
consistent with Williamson’s description of contractual complexity. 
Poppo and Zenger (2002) consider more complex contracts to have a greater
specification of promises, obligations, and processes for dispute resolution. Complex
contracts offer details on roles and responsibilities to be performed, specify procedures for
monitoring and penalties for noncompliance, and determine outcomes or outputs to be
delivered. These authors’ treatment of the concept captures the term specificity dimension
appearing in Williamson’s description of complexity and in Luo’s (2002) characterization of
completeness.
Ryall and Sampson (2003:12) refer to contract completeness as “the degree to which
6required inputs, expected outputs and division of intellectual property rights are fully
specified.” This depiction portrays the term specificity dimension, but it does not consider the
contingency adaptability component of contractual completeness (Luo, 2002). As a matter of
fact, they consider contract completeness as just one dimension of contract “tightness,” which
they characterize as correlated with the number of terms in the contract.
From this brief review we may infer that contract complexity and contract
completeness are confused in the literature. We contend that while contract complexity is a
feature of a contract per se, contract completeness is relative to the attributes of the
transaction. For instance, a contract governing a simple transaction may not be complex but
may be complete, just as a contract for a more elaborate exchange relationship may be
complex but not complete.
We  define  contractual complexity as a design feature of firms’ contractual
agreements that reflects the number and stringency of the provisions employed (Reuer and
Ariño, 2003). A contract with many, highly stringent provisions is more complex than one
with few, less stringent provisions. Based on Luo (2002: 904-905), we define contractual
completeness as a design feature of firms’ contractual agreements that reflects the extent to
which all relevant terms and clauses are specified, and the extent to which the contract
accounts for unanticipated contingencies and delineates relevant guidelines for handling these
contingencies. For a given transaction, we safely may say that a contract with more specific
and detailed terms is more complete than one with less specific and detailed terms. However,
when comparing contracts across different transactions such a statement could not be upheld:
a contract with fewer terms may be more complete than one with more detailed terms if the
former specifies all the terms and clauses that are relevant to the transaction while the latter
does not. In the absence of detailed knowledge about the transaction a contract refers to, we
believe it is preferable to focus on contract complexity than on contract completeness, as
assessing the latter requires information that researchers often lack.
Contractual complexity and contractual completeness: The measures
In this section, we review measures of contractual complexity and contractual
completeness used in alliance studies (see Table 2). Although we believe they are all
measures of contractual complexity, we will respect the authors’ labels, be they complexity,
completeness or anything else.
7Table 2. Measure of alliance contrctual complexity used in the literature
Study Measure
Parkhe  Contractual safeguards =                Di = i if provision i exists; Di = 0 otherwise
1993
Provisions: (1) periodic written reports of all relevant transactions; (2) prompt written notice of
any departures from the agreement; (3) the right to examine and audit all relevant records
through a firm of CPAs; (4) designation of certain information as proprietary and subject to
confidentiality provisions of the contract; (5) non-use of proprietary information even after
termination of agreement; (6) termination of agreement; (7) arbitration clauses; and (8) lawsuit
provisions.
Deeds & Hill 
(1998) Contractual safeguards =               Di = 1 if provision i exists; Di = 0 otherwise
Provisions: same as Parkhe (1993)
Poppo & 
Zenger (2002) Contractual complexity: 1-item (7-point scale): “the formal contract is highly customized and
required considerable work”
Reuer &  
Ariño (2002) Contractual complexity: same measure as Parkhe (1993)
Luo (2202) Two dimensions of contract completeness confirmed through factor analysis:
• Term specificity: mean of responses assessing the degree to which a JV contract specifies
relevant terms and clauses concerning the following (5-point scale) (detailed terms and
clauses were listed under each of these categories, but are not reported): 
(1) how to set up the JV; (2) how to operate and manage the JV; and (3) how to cooperate
and resolve conflict between partners; (4) how to terminate the JV.
• Contingency adaptability: mean of responses stating the extent to which (5-point scale): 
(1) term specification is adaptive for issues that are particularly vulnerable to an uncertain
environment or resource availability; (2) the contract has specified major principles or
guidelines for handling unanticipated contingencies as they arise; and (3) the contract has
provided alternative solutions for responding to various contingencies that are likely to arise.
Reuer &  
Ariño (2003) Contractual complexity:
• same measure as Parkhe (1993)
• modified measure:   Xi = 1 if provision i exists; Xi = 0 otherwise
Two dimensions of contractual complexity identified through factor analysis of tetrachoric
correlations among provisions (same mathematical formulas as before):
• Partner control: provisions (4) to (8) (see Parkhe, 1993)
• Operations control: provisions (1) to (3) (see Parkhe, 1993)
Reuer, Ariño 
& Mellewigt  Contractual complexity: same measures as Parkhe (1993) and Reuer & Ariño (2002)
(2003)
Ryall &  Contract completeness:
Sampson 
(2003) • Xi = 1 if completeness clause i exists; Xi = 0 otherwise
• dummy variable = 1 if the contract contains three or more completeness clauses; 0 otherwise
Completeness clauses: (1) development specifications (such as tolerances) included; (2) time
frame for completion of each stage specified; (3) number of employees to be contributed
specified; (4) specific persons stipulated for management or other development work; (5)





















i XParkhe (1993) develops a measure of contractual safeguards. Specifically, he
developed a checklist of contractual safeguards obtained from a computer-assisted search of
the legal literature (cf. Macneil, 1978, 1981; Narasimhan, 1989; Practicing Law Institute,
1986) and documented eight provisions (see Table 2). These different types of alliance
safeguards are arrayed in increasing order of strength or severity, so a weighting scheme for
the stringency of contractual provisions can be adopted to arrive at the global measure of
contractual complexity that appears in Table 2. This measure works as follows. Di equals one
if the first provision was employed, zero otherwise; two if the second provision was
employed, zero otherwise; and so on. The summation term therefore ranges from 0 to 36, and
the division by 36 yields a measure ranging from zero to one. When the variable takes on a
value of zero, none of the eight provisions listed above are in place. When the variable
assumes its maximum value of one, all of the eight provisions appear in the alliance
agreement.
Deeds and Hill (1998) modify Parkhe’s measure in the following way. They asked
respondents to report on the inclusion in the contract of the same provisions as Parkhe
(1993). However, they use as a measure of contractual safeguards the proportion of the total
items included in the alliance (see Table 2), so they do not weight individual provisions by
their stringency.
Reuer and Ariño (2002) use Parkhe’s measure of contractual safeguards, which they
refer to as contractual complexity in later articles (Reuer and Ariño, 2003; Reuer, Ariño and
Mellewigt, 2003). For comparative purposes, Reuer and Ariño (2003) assign each provision
the same weight (see this modified measure in Table 2). The authors obtain the same results
with this unweighted measure—similar to the one used by Deeds and Hill (1998)—as with
Parkhe’s original weighted measure, which provided evidence that the stringency weights did
not influence interpretations of the antecedents of more or less complex alliance agreements.
More importantly, Reuer and Ariño (2003) explore whether contractual complexity
is a multidimensional construct. They use exploratory factor analysis of tetrachoric
correlations among the provisions used in Parkhe’s measure. They find that the provisions
load on the two factors in accordance with their order of stringency, and none of the
provisions load in a manner inconsistent with their ranked stringency.
They label the first factor “partner control,” as provisions loading highly on it deal
with concerns about the partner’s behavior outside the alliance itself, such as the use of
information outside of the scope of the alliance, the ending of the collaborative agreement,
and the use of outside parties to resolve disputes. The authors label the second factor
“operations control,” as it relates more directly to the monitoring of the collaborative
agreement during its lifespan.
Poppo and Zenger (2002) measure contractual complexity by asking respondents to
indicate their level of agreement with the following statement: the formal contract is highly
customized and required considerable work (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).
As said earlier, Luo (2002) identifies two dimensions of contract completeness: term
specificity, and contingency adaptability. These dimensions are measured as specified in
Table 2. Factor analysis confirmed the existence of term specificity and contingency
adaptability as two factors. Luo explains that informants were asked to assess contract
completeness, benchmarking with the industry’s standard regarding the desired level of this
completeness. However, it looks as if this instruction referred only to term specificity, but not
to contingency adaptability. If this is so, Luo’s measures are measures of contractual
completeness; otherwise, they measure contractual complexity.
9Ryall and Sampson (2003) examine contract terms using a coding scheme that
considers contract completeness not as a characteristic of the entire contract, but just of some
of the terms considered in it. More specifically, their coding scheme considers three mutually
exclusive dimensions: contract completeness, monitoring, and penalties. For instance, the
existence of a term related to “content of reviews specified” contributes to the monitoring
dimension, but does not add to contract completeness. The terms considered to affect contract
completeness and the measures of this construct are shown in Table 2. Terms excluded from
the measure of contract completeness comprise monitoring terms (reviews of development
work required, timing of reviews specified, content of reviews specified, physical audits of
development work permitted, and reviews required of both firms), and penalty terms
(financial penalties for underperformance, and right to terminate for underperformance – as
distinct from ‘material breach’). In this way, although they acknowledge that contracts are
multidimensional, contract completeness is considered as unidimensional.
Despite the variety of labels used, all these measures seize the domain of the
contractual complexity concept: although to different extents, they capture the number and
stringency of the provisions used. However—with the possible exception of Luo’s (2002)
measure as already discussed—they do not capture the contractual completeness concept, as
they do not depict whether all relevant terms and clauses are specified. The identification of
distinct dimensions in some of the measures (Luo, 2002; Reuer and Ariño, 2003) allows more
fine-grained analyses than can be performed with more global, or unidimensional, measures.
Most measures may be applied across a broad spectrum of alliance contracts, as they are not
specific to the alliance purpose, an exception being the measure used by Ryall and Sampson
(2003), which is quite particular to technology alliances.
So far, we have argued that selecting contractual forms and governance forms are
two distinct issues in alliance management. We have dug into the contents of alliance
contracts and have argued that contractual complexity and contractual completeness are two
separate constructs. We advocate that, without detailed knowledge of firms’ exchange
relationships, it is generally more appropriate to talk about contractual complexity than
contractual completeness. Our review of contract-related measures shows that in fact they are
measures of contractual complexity, not of contractual completeness – maybe with the
exception of Luo’s (2002) measures. We turn now to the conditions identified in the literature
that drive contractual complexity. We introduce them with a brief consideration of the nature
of contracting costs and benefits.
Determinants of contractual complexity
Contractual provisions can be costly to negotiate, monitor, and enforce. Yet these
costs are efficient for firms to bear when the safeguards reduce the costs and performance
losses from exchange hazards that stem from both environmental and behavioral
uncertainties (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). Conditions leading to higher environmental
uncertainty augment contracting costs and would result in less complex agreements, while
conditions increasing the likelihood of opportunistic behavior augment the potential losses
from misbehavior and would result in more complex contracts (Crocker and Reynolds, 1993).
Contracting involves both ex ante and ex post costs (Williamson, 1985). Ex ante
costs include those of formalizing the agreement – determining a partner’s legal competence
to contract; reaching agreement on corresponding rights and responsibilities; conducting a
legal search; and finding a means of legally employing the resources (Ring, 2002). They also
include costs associated with gathering information about, and crafting optimal responses to,
10a potentially large set of feasible contingencies (Crocker and Reynolds, 1993). Ex post costs
are associated with contract renegotiation (Ring, 2002): legal fees, reorganization expenses,
opportunity costs due to management time (Reuer and Ariño, 2002), as well as costly
activities designed to shift the increasing risk of cost uncertainty (Crocker and Reynolds,
1993).
Ex ante and ex post contracting costs are interdependent (Williamson, 1985), and the
two are to be considered interactively (Ring, 2002). Conditions “that generate increased
contracting costs should result in efficient contracts being less complete, whereas conditions
that exacerbate the potential for ex post inefficiencies should lead to more exhaustive
agreements” (Crocker and Reynolds, 1993:127).
In this section, we review a number of conditions that may affect ex ante and ex post
contracting costs, as well as contracting benefits. The illustrative conditions are the level of
transaction specific investments, the existence of prior ties, whether the alliance is time-
bound or open-ended, the strategic importance partners assign to the alliance, and the level of
the costs associated to searching for alternative partners. For each condition, we elaborate
briefly on how it influences contractual complexity, and we present related research results.
Transaction specific investments
When asset specificity is low, resources can be deployed to other relationships or
businesses without difficulty, and partner identity is not important (Klein, Crawford, and
Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1991). As the partner cannot threaten to hold up the firm under
this condition, the firm has little incentive to bear the costs associated with designing a more
complex contract in an attempt to stabilize the relationship. However, when a firm makes
transaction-specific investments in an alliance, the partner can jeopardize the alliance by
threatening dissolution, which would mean the firm would lose the value of specialized
assets. Faced with such threats, managers must evaluate the value losses and ex post
renegotiation costs they would experience from hold-up behavior against the additional costs
of negotiating safeguards into their alliance contracts ex ante. As the potential value loss
increases with investments in specific assets, managers will find it advantageous to negotiate
more complex contracts to cover the consequences of breach and termination as well as
designing the processes by which such threats will be handled (Dyer, 1997; Poppo and
Zenger, 2002; Reuer and Ariño, 2003).
Poppo and Zenger (2002) find support for this conjecture, as their results indicate
the use of more customized, complex contracts as asset specificity increases. Reuer and
Ariño (2003) show similar findings: the greater the transaction-specific investment in an
alliance, the greater the number and stringency of contractual provisions built into the
alliance contract. This result holds using unidimensional, weighted and non-weighted,
measures of contract complexity. The authors’ disaggregated analysis contemplating two
dimensions of contract complexity –partner-control provision and operations-control
provisions– suggests that firms use the more stringent provisions oriented to control the
partner as asset specificity increases, but the presence or absence of transaction-specific
investments has no apparent influence on the usage of weaker contractual provisions
designed for monitoring an alliance’s operations.
In contrast, Reuer, Ariño and Mellewigt (2003) find no significant influence of asset
specificity on contractual complexity; instead, asset specificity relates to the decision to adopt
an equity alliance over a non-equity alliance. In order to examine whether asset specificity
11leads to greater contractual complexity in alliances without additional governance
mechanisms in place, these authors performed their analyses in a sub-sample of non-equity
alliances, obtaining similar non-significant results. This outcome contrasts with prior
evidence on contract design and the role of transaction-specific investments (e.g., Joskow,
1988; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). As asset specificity has been associated with contractual
complexity in non-alliance domains (e.g., Joskow, 1988), the authors attribute their findings
to the empirical setting – German telecommunications companies. Given the high
technological uncertainty in this environment, the likelihood of contractual renegotiation is
very high, so complex contracts are also likely to require costly renegotiations. Faced with
the risk of hold-up under these circumstances, managers may prefer to protect themselves by
turning to a governance solution instead of a contractual solution (e.g., Poppo and Zenger,
2002).
Prior ties
Although the threat of opportunism will be a function of the particular attributes of
the alliance in question, it can also be shaped by firms’ prior collaborative histories with one
another. Relational contracts are possible because repeated exchanges between firms induce
cooperation as the possibility of putting an end to relations acts as a self-enforcing sanction
(e.g., Telser, 1980). By contrast, firms entering into relationships with new partners support
these relationships with formal contractual provisions and rely upon the court system for
enforcement (Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff, 2002). Thus, on the one hand, the existence
of previous relationships among the partners reduces behavioral uncertainty and may allow
for a lower level of contractual complexity. On the other hand, those previous relationships
result in lower contracting costs, thus allowing the partners to negotiate more complex
contracts without incurring higher costs. We turn now to examine these two separate effects.
There are two mechanisms by which successive collaborative relationships between
firms can reduce behavioral uncertainty and thus make it possible for firms to avoid the costs
of designing more complex alliances. The first mechanism is the trust that emerges from
successive collaborative relationships between firms and that may be a substitute for more
elaborate governance. Trust is an efficient substitute for formal contractual provisions
because the firms have already invested in relationship building and have borne set-up costs,
which would need to be incurred for alternative safeguards (e.g., Klein, 1980). Dyer (1997)
suggests that Japanese automakers’ networks have lower transaction costs than their U.S.
counterparts because they engage in repeated exchanges. Related evidence from buyer-
supplier relations confirms that interorganizational trust allows firms to economize on
negotiation costs (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone, 1998). In sum, repeat alliances pose less
moral hazard concerns (Gulati, 1998) than first-time alliances because the partner’s behavior
is more predictable, as is its competence to deliver the expected contributions (Ring, 2002).
A second mechanism by which successive collaborative relationships between firms
reduce behavioral uncertainty is the development of interorganizational routines. In addition,
such routines allow firms to avoid the costs of detailing mechanisms for monitoring and
coordination (Gulati, 1998; Zollo, Reuer, and Singh, 2002). As firms enter into repeated
collaborative agreements with each other, partners develop a better understanding of each
other’s procedures, management systems, cultures, and so forth. This mutual understanding
can help firms alleviate problems related to coordination, conflict resolution, or information
gathering that otherwise can be addressed by means of formal contractual provisions. Parkhe
(1993) shows that partners’ cooperative history reduces coordination efforts and compliance
costs; in turn, these diminish the need for contractual safeguards. Similarly, Dyer and Singh
12(1998) suggest that the relationship-specific knowledge that emerges from frequent and
intense partner interactions builds a firm’s relational capabilities, which can improve the
efficiency of alliances. Whether prior strategic alliances between firms enhance
the development of interorganizational trust and/or routines, such prior relationships result in
a reduced behavioral uncertainty and allow firms to avoid more complex contracts.
However, as already anticipated, when the parties share a history of frequent
exchange in which promises have been fulfilled, contract negotiation costs are lower (Ring,
2002). Thus, prior ties may allow for the design of complex contracts without incurring the
same costs as partners transacting for the first time have to bear for a similar level of
contractual complexity. Ring (2002) suggests that when partners have worked together in
other alliances, they have discussed certain conditions and agreed on them already; to the
extent that some of these conditions are “boilerplate” or common terms, including them in a
new alliance contract entails no additional cost. In addition, partners with prior relationships
have developed a mutual knowledge that allows them to discuss behavioral uncertainty issues
that would be extremely costly for newly transacting partners to address – or even identify.
“Previous cooperation fosters a climate of openness that is essential to discussing behavioral
problems (…). By the same token, two parties that have cooperated earlier tend to be more
collaborative in adapting to unanticipated environmental hazards. In order to jointly gain
greater rents from cooperation and adaptation, they are likely to keep a contract’s
contingency adaptability at a high level” (Luo, 2002: 907). Prior relationships allow partners
to learn what they need to specify and what contingencies to consider (Mayer, 2003).
In sum, these arguments suggest that past relationships diminish behavioral
uncertainty, be this because of the trust built through those relationships or because of the
development of coordination mechanisms and routines. In either case, past relationships
would allow for the use of less complex contracts. However, past relationships also reduce
contracting costs and make partners aware of issues hard to identify in the absence of a
certain mutual knowledge. Consequently, contracts may turn out to be more complex in the
presence of prior ties. Which of these effects dominates will dictate the use of complex
contracts as substitutes or complements to trust.
Reuer and Ariño (2003) find that in the presence of prior alliances firms specify
fewer provisions relating to alliance operation control. However, the existence of prior ties
does not influence the use of provisions concerning partner control. These results support the
argument that the routines built through past relationships preclude the need to use contracts
in order to set up coordination mechanisms, thus resulting in less complex contracts.
Conversely, these findings undermine the argument that contracts are used as substitutes for
trust. Along the same lines, Luo (2002) finds no significant association between previous
cooperation and the use of specific terms to obviate opportunism in the contract. 
Ryall and Sampson (2003) show that when firms are engaged in multiple alliances
with the same partner, some “boilerplate” provisions such as arbitration clauses are identical
between alliance contracts. This provides evidence that partners economize contracting costs
by incorporating into their new contracts clauses already negotiated and agreed upon for past
contracts. Reuer, Zollo, and Singh (2002) also find that firms tend to be more apt to alter
alliance contracts when they have collaborated with each other in the past.
Poppo and Zenger (2002) find that prior relationships between firms lead to more
detailed contracts. Ryall and Sampson (2003) interpret this result to provide evidence that
prior relationships allow partners to learn more about each other and draft better, and perhaps
tighter, contracts. Consistent with this, Luo (2002) shows that previous cooperation is
13significantly and positively associated with contingency adaptability. Ryall and Sampson
(2003) find that contracts are more detailed when firms have allied with each other
previously; however, contracts are less complex in the case of concurrent alliances with the
same partner, even when alliance duration and technology breadth are controlled for. These
authors’ interpretation of these findings is that “firms gain experience in drafting effective
collaborative agreements with prior alliances, which allows these firms to specify rights,
obligations and development costs at lower cost. In contrast, concurrent alliance relationships
with the same partner may operate as an informal means to deter non-cooperative behavior,
since such behavior can affect the future prospects not only of the current alliance, but also of
the concurrent alliance” (p.4). This interpretation is consistent with the fact that learning
about what to specify and what contingencies to consider may be derived from prior ties,
while concurrent ties may provide this learning opportunity only at a later time. Luo’s (2002)
argument that previous cooperation allows the companies to discuss –and agree upon– issues
that newly transacting partners would not be able even to identify is in consonance with this
set of research findings.
Overall, the results from recent research we have reviewed tend to back the claim
that contracts are used as complements to, and not as substitutes for, trust. This is not
necessarily in contradiction with findings from past research showing that firms with prior
collaborative agreements tend to choose non-equity alliances over equity alliances (c.f.,
Gulati 1995; Oxley, 1997), given the distinction we traced earlier in this chapter between
contractual form and governance form.
Time boundedness
Strategic alliances designed to operate for a pre-specified length of time experience
lower environmental uncertainty than alliances with open-ended durations. In the former
case, partners are in better shape to anticipate different future states and efficiently specify
their duties and rights under these different states (e.g., Noldeke and Schmidt, 1995). As
partners have negotiated explicit time bounds on their alliances, they are also more likely to
be aware of related issues covered in alliance contracts, such as ownership of proprietary
technology, disclosure of confidential information, and alliance termination. Conversely,
when firms place no bounds on the duration of the alliance, it can be costly to anticipate
future economic conditions and craft contractual provisions that provide adequate responses.
So as to avoid these transaction costs, firms tend to rely on incomplete contracts under these
conditions (Crocker and Reynolds, 1993).
The presence or absence of time bounds on alliances can affect not only the level of
environmental uncertainty faced by the partners, but also the level of behavioral uncertainty.
Open-ended alliances are self-enforcing agreements in that the potential gains from future
collaboration provide a safeguard against opportunistic behavior meant to appropriate more
immediate payoffs (Telser, 1980). As suggested by Hill (1990), opportunism is viable if the
future is not important to the provoker. By contrast, the shadow of the future is shorter in
time-bound alliances, which do not support a tit-for-tat equilibrium of cooperation that can
protect from opportunism (Axelrod, 1984). Given these characteristics, time-bound alliances
do not lend themselves to act as self-enforcing agreements, and formal contractual provisions
may be required to safeguard them.
In sum, alliances with a pre-specified duration entail lower environmental but higher
behavioral uncertainty than open-ended alliances. Lower environmental uncertainty entails
lower contracting costs, which is likely to result in more complex contracts, while higher
14behavioral uncertainty likewise provides incentives to design more complex contracts. Thus,
alliances with a pre-specified duration can be expected to have more complex contracts than
open-ended alliances.
Turning to empirical evidence, Crocker and Reynolds (1993) find –albeit in a non-
alliance context– that more distant dates of contract performance lead to more incomplete
exchange agreements because of the higher environmental uncertainty and the consequently
increased costs of implementing more complete contracts. Luo (2002) shows that the longer a
JV is expected to last, the higher it ranks in terms of contingency adaptability, resulting in
more complex contracts along the contract dimension that deals with environmental
uncertainty.
Focusing on the impact of behavioral uncertainty, Parkhe (1993) shows that long
time horizons decrease uncertainty regarding potential opportunism, which in turn diminishes
the need for complex contracts. Luo (2002) finds a negative impact of expected duration on
term specificity, and Reuer and Ariño (2003) provide evidence that alliance agreements with
specified durations tend to rely more heavily on partner control provisions, but less on
operations control provisions.
Taken together, these findings suggest that open-ended alliances result in complex
contracts to the extent that they incorporate provisions for contingency adaptability and
control of alliance operation. Other than this, open-ended alliances tend to use less complex
contracts than alliances with a pre-specified duration.
Strategic importance of the alliance
Increasingly, alliances are between actual or potential competitors, involve two-way
knowledge transfers, and have global market aspirations (e.g. Hagedoorn, 1993; Gomes-
Casseres, 1996). As a reflection of these changes, firms are applying more disciplined
processes for selecting partners and negotiating collaborative agreements (e.g., Harbison and
Pekar, 1998) and are implementing positions or functions dedicated to managing their
strategic alliances (e.g., Kale, Dyer, and Singh, 2002). As a result, partners are more exposed
to the hazards such alliances involve (Koza and Lewin, 1998; Singh and Mitchell, 1996),
which include the risk of having a competitor appropriate key strategic resources (Khanna,
Gulati, and Nohria, 1998; Branstetter and Sakakibara, 2002). Firms are therefore justified in
bearing additional costs to clarify rights and obligations concerning the scope of the alliance
(Borys and Jemison, 1989), ownership claims on proprietary technology provided to
or created during the alliance, and the management of the alliance’s termination. In light
of these risks, managers will also have an incentive to detail the ways in which
strategically important alliances will be monitored and any disputes that arise will be
resolved as the alliance evolves (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Doz, 1996). Additionally,
strategically important alliances tend to involve more complexity (Hagedoorn, 1993), making
it more costly to reach agreement for establishing mutual consent (Ring, 2002). The
strategic importance a firm assigns to an alliance reflects the firm’s attitude and commitment
to it (Deeds and Hill, 1998). The more valuable the contributed resources, the more
extended contract negotiations will be (Ring, 2002). Thus, managers will be more willing to
dedicate the additional resources that negotiating a complex contract entails when the
contract is for a strategically important alliance.
Reuer and Ariño (2003) and Reuer, Ariño and Mellewigt (2003) demonstrate that
the greater the strategic importance of an alliance, the more complex the alliance contract  is.
15These results hold when using a unidimensional measure of contractual complexity, both
weighted and non-weighted. However, when using disaggregate measures, Reuer and Ariño
(2003) find that the strategic importance of alliances shapes the usage of partner control
provisions in alliance contracts, but has no impact on firms’ adoption of the provisions for
alliance operation control. These results speak of the importance that behavioral uncertainty
takes in strategically important agreements.
Search costs
Searching for potential exchange partners can be costly given the various expenses
incurred when scrutinizing potential partners, and the need to involve a good number of
agents in the process (e.g., Arrow, 1974). Screening potential exchange partners takes time
and negotiation entails delays, and these costs are non-trivial (Wernerfelt, 2004). These
inefficiencies in the market for alliance partners suggest that alliance termination may affect
firms unfavorably, even if their commitments to a collaborative arrangement are not entirely
partner-specific. Because search costs for an alliance partner are sunk and these costs would
need to be incurred in locating a new partner, the firm has an incentive to design a more
complex contract to allocate duties, design processes for unforeseeable outcomes, and specify
exchanges and remedies in more precise terms. The greater the search costs involved in
locating a partner for a particular transaction, the greater the firm’s incentive to bear the costs
of designing more complex contractual arrangements. By contrast, if the firm can find an
alternative partner with relative ease, the contract can be comparatively simple, since the
costs of switching to another exchange partner will be lower, and it is therefore more likely
that the relationship will be self-enforcing. Empirical evidence on the incidence of search
costs on alliance contractual complexity is scarce, with Reuer, Ariño and Mellewigt (2003)
finding that the greater the search costs for an alliance partner, the greater the complexity of
the alliance contract.
Conclusion
Our purpose in this paper has been to offer an overview of research on strategic
alliance contracts, still scarce given the difficulties in accessing this kind of data. We have
distinguished alliance contractual form and governance form, as these are often confused in
the literature, even though they serve different purposes. We have traced the distinction
between two related constructs frequently mixed in the literature: contractual complexity and
contractual completeness. It seems to us that in the absence of detailed knowledge about
transaction attributes it is more appropriate to consider and refer to contractual complexity
than to contractual completeness. In fact, most of the measures used in the literature –though
labeled in different ways– in fact assess contractual complexity rather than completeness.
Finally, we have examined the conditions that may warrant the design of more or less
complex alliance contracts depending on their effect on environmental and behavioral
uncertainties, and thus on the costs and benefits of contracting.
More work remains to be done. One area that has received virtually no attention is
that of contracting as a process, the outcome of which goes beyond a legal document. “In
contracting, the legal requirement of mutual consent and commitment –a meeting of the
minds– is achieved by (a) process of sense making” (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994: 100). And
sense making may result in a psychological contract which may complement or serve as a
substitute for a formal document. In Ring and Van de Ven’s (1994) framework, contracting is
16a part of the commitments stage of alliances, a stage in which “the ‘wills of the parties meet’
(Commons, 1950) when they reach an agreement on the obligations and rules for future
action in the relationship” (p.98). Sense making will occur only if the parties interact
intensively. Through these interactions, the parties assess their possible compatibility and
start forming opinions about one another. The parties may develop a psychological contract
about the terms of the relationship (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994), a benefit of the contracting
process that is not considered in discussions of contracting costs and benefits. Arguably, both
a legal contract and a psychological contract are necessary for the satisfactory development
of an alliance. On the one hand, an excessive focus on legal issues may lead to distrust
among parties. On the other hand, the absence of formal legal structures paves the way to an
abuse of trust. Thus, a balance between formal and informal aspects of contracting may be
desirable. A well managed contracting process, centered in sense-making and mutual
understanding, can produce both a tight legal contract that sets specific terms and ways to
adapt under a number of contingencies, and a psychological contract that allows the parties to
reach mutually satisfactory agreements when facing unforeseen circumstances. We believe
that research into alliance contracts along these lines will be important to move beyond the
literature’s current emphasis on discrete governance structures, and also to provide more
detailed guidance to managers designing and negotiating collaborative agreements.
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